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ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IN ILLINOIS
Assumption of the risk, one of the three "sinister sisters" of the common
law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the
fellow-servant rule, retains a limited vitality in Illinois law. The doctrine
has received varied and confusing treatment by the courts in all jurisdic-
tions as to just what the doctrine embodies and when it may be appropri-
ately used.' Illinois represents the minority view that the defense of assump-
tion of risk is limited to the master-servant relation.2 This note will demon-
strate that such an approach is perhaps not an unwarranted restriction, as
the result reached in Illinois is not different from the result reached in
other jurisdictions. Illinois merely uses other terms in place of the broad
application of the doctrine to accomplish the same result. However, there
are certain instances wherein the proper use of the doctrine may be helpful,
such as in cases of strict liability, intentional tort or comparative negligence.
Assumption of the risk emerged as a defense to the common law action
by a servant against his master, the greatest impetus being afforded the doc-
trine in 1837 by Priestley v. Fowler3 in England. The court found that
there was no duty owed by the master for the safety of his servant, as the
plaintiff's declaration did not contain a charge that defendant knew of the
dangerous condition. The court found for defendant because the court be-
lieved it would be inconvenient and absurd to allow recovery since it was
most likely that the plaintiff knew as much as the defendant about the con-
dition and thus should have declined to serve the defendant. The court
failed to recognize the vast problems of the ever developing industrial age.
Generally, it was an economic fact that if the plaintiff had declined to serve
his master he might not only lose his job but not find employment else-
where.
The doctrine of assumption of the risk was first articulated in Illinois
in the 1874 case of Camp Point Mfg. Co. v. Ballou,4 an action against an
employer for the death of an employee by reason of alleged defective ma-
chinery provided by the employer. The Illinois Supreme Court cited other
jurisdictions for the proposition that an employee cannot recover for an
injury from machinery which the employee knew to be defective. The em-
ployee's choice of proceeding despite such defect showed an assumption of
the risk.
The general principle of the doctrine is that a plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
1 See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14 (1906); Wade, The
Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5 (1961); 82 A.L.R.2d
1218 (1962).
2 Maytnier v. Rush, 80 Il. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1st Dist. 1967); See Annot.,
82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
a 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837); Prosser, Torts § 450 (3d ed. 1965).
4 71 Ill. 417 (1874).
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defendant cannot recover for such harm.5 In most situations, assumption of
the risk is probably best understood by focusing upon the doctrine's
primary and secondary meanings. In its primary meaning, the injured
person's conduct in assuming a particular risk is reasonable, the defense
being a denial that the defendant was negligent. The defendant states that
he was under no duty or that he breached no duty of protecting the plain-
tiff against the source of his injury. Illustrative of the primary meaning of
assumption of the risk is Schmidt v. Cenacle Convent.6 In that case, the
plaintiff, an invitee, was injured when she slipped and fell on a waxed
floor, with no evidence as to exactly why she fell. Assumption of the risk was
not even brought out by the defendant as an affirmative defense. However,
the court stated that waxing floors is too common a practice to give rise to
liability without showing negligence by the defendant. The result could
have been stated that the plaintiff assumed the risk of walking on a normal,
ordinary waxed floor and, absent the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
was barred from recovery.
In the secondary meaning of assumption of the risk, the injured plain-
tiff's conduct is unreasonable, in which case the doctrine overlaps or be-
comes identical with contributory negligence. Courts in general have con-
fused assumption of the risk with contributory negligence, using terminology
of the two defenses interchangeably3
The courts have repeatedly stated that the defenses of assumption of
the risk and contributory negligence are distinct from one anothers but
their explanations have been somewhat confusing. It has been held that
contributory negligence involves fault or lack of due care, while assump-
tion of the risk does not;9 that assumption of the risk rests on the law of
contracts, whereas contributory negligence rests on the law of torts;1 0 that
contributory negligence involves inadvertance or unintentional failure to
measure up to a proper standard of self-protection, while assumption of the
risk involves the conscious and deliberate decision to encounter a known
risk; 1" or that the standard to be applied to the issue of assumption of the
5 Rest. 2d, Torts § 486A (1965).
6 86 Ill. App. 2d 150, 229 N.E.2d 413 (2d Dist. 1967).
7 Roberts v. King, 102 Ga. App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885 (1960); Inouye v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 53 Cal. 2d 361, 348 P.2d 208 (1959); King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 140 Colo.
119, 342 P.2d 1006 (1959); Warlich v. Miller, 73 F. Supp. 593 (D.C. Pa. 1947); Waddel's
Adm'r. v. Brashear, 257 Ky. 390, 78 S.W.2d 31 (1934); Edwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 648, 288
N.W. 875 (1939).
8 Wills v. Paul, 24 Ill. App. 2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 631 (3d Dist. 1960); Wheeler V.
Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 267 Ill. 306, 108 N.E. 330 (1915); Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Heerey,
203 Ill. 492, 68 N.E. 416 (1900).
9 Holsman v. Darling State Street Corp., 6 Ill. App. 2d 517, 128 N.E.2d 581 (Ist Dist.
1959); Minters v. Mid-City Management Corp., 331 Ill. App. 64, 72 N.E.2d 729 (1st Dist.
1947); I.P.I. § 13 (1961).
10 Chicago Hair & Bristle Co. v. Mueller, 106 Ill. App. 21 (1st Dist. 1903), aff'd. 203
Ill. 558, 68 N.E. 51 (1903).
11 Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev.
5 (1961).
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risk is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff sees, knows, under-
stands and appreciates, while in determining an issue of contributory negli-
gence, the plaintiff's conduct is measured against an objective standard of
what a reasonable and careful person would do under the same or similar
circumstances.' 2
Confusion between the two doctrines is apparent in Wheat v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 13 which held that one cannot expose himself to danger
which he might have avoided through reasonable care for his own safety
and then recover damages for a resulting injury. Illinois thereby included
the situation where the plaintiff unreasonably proceeds in the face of a
known risk in the category of contributory negligence.
To arrive at a realistic and workable definition of assumption of the
risk, one must first realize that the doctrine's general application in its
primary and secondary sense is too broad. Assumption of the risk should
be distinguished by the general use of a subjective standard as to whether
the plaintiff saw, knew and appreciated the risk or danger and unreasonably
chose to encounter such risk despite the plaintiff's knowledge. Where the
plaintiff's choice was reasonable the defendant must be content with a de-
fense of no duty or failure to breach a duty owed to the plaintiff or that
the defendant's act was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Where the plaintiff's choice was unreasonable, contributory negligence
should be available as a defense unless the particular case is such that the
defense of contributory negligence is not available, at which time the doc-
trine of assumption of the risk would be useful and appropriate.
TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IN ILLINOIS
Most Illinois courts have held that the doctrine of assumed risk grows
out of the contractual relation of the parties14 and that it comes into exis-
tence only as an incident of the contract of employment.15 However, some
cases have held that the doctrine is not limited to the master-servant re-
12 Clubb v. Main, 65 Ill. App. 2d 461, 213 N.E.2d 63 (5th Dist. 1965); Rest. 2d, Torts
§ 496A (1965).
13 Wheat v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 262 F.2d 289 (1959), cert. den. 359 U.S. 1005, 79
Sup. Ct. 1145 (1959); Carter v. Winter, 32 Ill. 2d 275, 204 N.E.2d 755 (1965), cert. den. 382
U.S. 825, 86 Sup. Ct. 56 (1965) (also denies existence of comparative negligence in Illinois).
14 Consolidated Barb Wire Co. v. Maxwell, 116 Ill. App. 296 (2d Dist. 1904); St. Louis
National Stock Yards v. Morris, 116 11. App. 107 (4th Dist. 1904); Reed v. Zellers, 273
Ill. App. 18 (3d Dist. 1933); Walsh v. Moore, 244 Ill. App. 458 (4th Dist. 1927).
15 Maytnier v. Rush, 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1st Dist. 1967); Fosen v. Odell
Grain & Coal Co., 70 Ill. App. 2d 384, 217 N.E.2d 126 (4th Dist. 1966); Hensley v. Hensley,
62 Ill. App. 2d 252, 210 N.E.2d 568 (5th Dist. 1965) (extensive discussion of doctrine);
Hammer v. Slive, 27 Ill. App. 2d 196, 169 N.E.2d 400 (2d Dist. 1960); Davis v. Springfield
Lodge No. 158, 24 Ill. App. 2d 102, 164 N.E.2d 243 (3d Dist. 1960); Streeter v. Western
Wheeled Scraper Co., 254 Ill. 244, 98 N.E. 541 (1911); Conrad v. Springfield Consolidated
R.R. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N.E. 180 (1909); O'Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill. 576, 89 N.E. 663
(1909); Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 111. 242, 76 N.E. 354 (1906).
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lationship 16 and that the doctrine is applicable to any relation voluntarily
assumed.17 A review of Illinois law's application of assumption of the risk
in the employment or master-servant situation will show how the doctrine
generally has been used in this State.
The employee is said to assume the risks, hazards or dangers ordinarily
incident to the discharge of his duties,' 8 ordinary risks being those which
are a part of the natural and usual method of conducting the business, even
though they might fairly be called extraordinary with respect to other
businesses. 19 However, although the employer is required to provide a
reasonably safe workplace,20 his duty would not extend to employees whose
duty it is to make a dangerous workplace safe.21 The employer's negligence
is not considered an ordinary and usual risk incident to employment,22 and
merely because it is a hazardous occupation does not provide an immunity
for the employer from his negligence. 23
Following the primary meaning of assumption of the risk, it has been
held that an employee assumes only those risks which will remain after the
employer has exercised the reasonable care required of him to provide safe
working conditions. 24 The employee has a right to assume that the em-
ployer will perform the duties imposed upon him, 2 5 unless such employee
is chargeable with knowledge of the defect and that he appreciated or
understood the danger therefrom.26 Thus, there is a subjective rule imposed
16 Hargis v. Standard Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 119, 134 N.E.2d 518 (4th Dist. 1956);
Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (2d Dist. 1952); Smith v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 339 Ill. App. 501, 90 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist. 1950); Macabee
v. Miller, 316 Ill. App. 157, 44 N.E.2d 341 (lst Dist. 1942); Stickel v. Riverview Sharp-
shooters' Park Co., 159 Ill. App. 110 (1st Dist. 1910), aff'd. 250 Ill. 452, 95 N.E. 445 (1910);
I.P.I. § 13.01 (1961).
17 Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1st Dist. 1938)
(this was the only case discovered which took such a strong stand on the doctrine's general
applicability).
18 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Benson, 352 Ill. 195, 185 N.E. 244 (1933), cert. den.
290 U.S. 636, 54 Sup. Ct. 53 (1933); Kenney v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 243 Ill. 396, 90
N.E. 724 (1910).
19 Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Wild, 109 Ill. App. 38 (3d Dist. 1903).
20 Crawford v. Brockhouse, 27 Ill. App. 2d 13, 169 N.E.2d 117 (3d Dist. 1960); Inter-
national Packing Co. v. Cichowicz, 107 Ill. App. 234 (1st Dist. 1903), aff'd. 206 Ill. 346, 68
N.E. 1083 (1903); 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, § 138 (1941).
21 Romeo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 157 Ill. App. 67 (4th Dist. 1910; Tygett V.
Sunnyside Coal Co., 140 Ill. App. 77 (4th Dist. 1908).
22 Lester v. Hennessey, 20 111. App. 2d 479, 156 N.E.2d 247 (3d Dist. 1959); Stone v.
Guthrie, 14 Ill. App. 2d 137, 144 N.E.2d 165 (3d Dist. 1957); Richardson v. Wells Bros. Co.,
159 Ill. App. 358 (Ist Dist. 1911); National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Fagen, 115 Ill.
App. 590 (4th Dist. 1904).
23 Wenger v. Strobel Steel Const. Co., 170 Ill. App. 383 (1st Dist. 1912).
24 Hansell-Elcock Foundry Co. v. Clark, 214 111. 399, 73 N.E. 787 (1905).
25 Stone v. Guthrie, supra note 22; McCulloch v. Illinois Steel Co., 243 Ill. 464, 90
N.E. 664 (1910).
26 Crawford v. Brockhouse, 27 111. App. 2d 13, 169 N.E.2d 117 (3d Dist. 1960); Wheeler
v. Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 182 Ill. App. 194 (1st Dist. 1913), aff'd. 267 Ill. 306, 108 N.E. 330
(1915); Richter v. Tegtmeyer, 167 Ill. App. 478 (1st Dist. 1912).
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upon the doctrine that the plaintiff knew of the risk and was aware of the
accompanying danger.27
If the danger has come to the employee's attention and he continues
in spite of it, the employee assumes the risk of injury,28 unless the employer
in some way negatives such assumption, such as by a direct order,2 9 an as-
surance that everything is all right,3 0 or a promise to remedy the defect.31
It is also held that a servant who chooses the more hazardous of two or
more methods by which he may perform his duties does so at his own risk,3 2
but it must appear that a reasonably safe method of doing the work was
available which the servant knew about and that the employee selected the
unsafe method voluntarily, knowing of the danger involved.33
Workmen's Compensation has virtually eliminated the common law
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow-ser-
vant rule in employee-employer relationships 34 by imposing a strict liability
upon "covered" employment. The employer is charged with injuries "in the
course of" and "arising out of" his business, without regard to the negli-
gence of the employer or employee. Under the Illinois Workmen's Com-
pensation Act an employer who is not "covered" may elect to come under
the Act or may later reject the Act with proper notice.3 5 This would imply
that non-covered employers may still benefit from the three common law
defenses, but it has been held that despite the employer's election not to
come under the provisions of the Act, such employer was nevertheless pre-
cluded from asserting these defenses.36
Assumption of the risk is expressly removed as an affirmative defense in
27 Fox v. Beal, 314 Ill. App. 144, 41 N.E.2d 126 (2d Dist. 1942); Lilly v. Grand Trunk
Western Ry. Co., 312 Ill. App. 73, 37 N.E.2d 888 (1st Dist. 1941); Byrne v. Marshall Field
& Co., 237 Ill. 384, 86 N.E. 748 (1908).
28 Wheeler v. Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 267 Ill. 306, 108 N.E. 330 (1915).
29 Ibid.
30 Harte v. Fraser, 104 Ill. App. 201 (1st Dist. 1902); City of Kinmundy v. Anderson,
103 Ill. App. 457 (4th Dist. 1902).
31 Russell v. Halyama, 27 Ill. App. 2d 359, 170 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1916); Scott v.
Parlin & Orendorff Co., 245 Ill. 460, 92 N.E. 318 (1910).
32 Stone v. Guthrie, 14 111. App. 2d 137, 144 N.E.2d 165 (3d Dist. 1957); Crowe v.
Northwestern Malt & Grain Co., 171 Ill. App. 285 (1st Dist. 1912); Alcorn v. Chicago, B.
& Q.R. Co., 158 Ill. App. 331 (3d Dist. 1910); Kath v. East St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co.,
232 Ill. 126, 83 N.E. 533 (1907).
33 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant § 450 p. 1277 (1948); See also, Wills v. Paul, 24 Ill.
App. 2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 631 (3d Dist. 1960) and Stahl v. Dow, 332 Ill. App. 233, 74
N.E.2d 907 (2d Dist. 1947) (in both cases plaintiff was injured by the very circumstances
confronting him when he took the job).
34 Mount Olive & Stanton Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm. 355 Ill. 222, 189 N.E. 296
(1934); Imperial Brass Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 306 Ill. 11, 137 N.E. 411 (1922); Ill.
Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq. (1965).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.2 (1965); (common law defenses may still be available
as to farmers who are specifically excluded by § 138.3).
36 Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 318 Ill. 151, 149 N.E. 11 (1925); Brooks
Tomato Products Co. v. Industrial Comm., 311 Ill. 207, 142 N.E. 451 (1924); New Staunton
Coal Co. v. Fromm, 286 Ill. 254, 121 N.E. 594 (1918); See Prosser, Torts § 82 (3d ed. 1965).
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any action to recover damages under the Occupational Diseases Act,8 7
whether the risk was expressly or impliedly assumed. The defense is also
unavailable under the Scaffolding Act,38 its purpose being to prevent in-
juries to persons employed in dangerous and extrahazardous occupations.3 9
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS
OUTSIDE OF THE MASTER-SERVANT AREA
Outside of cases involving the master-servant relationship, Illinois
courts have seldom allowed the doctrine of assumption of the risk to be
utilized successfully as a defense. The one area where the doctrine has
found fairly frequent use is in suits arising from injuries at places of amuse-
ment.4° In Maytnier v. Rush,41 a thirteen year old boy was struck on the
head by a baseball thrown into the stands from the bullpen while the game
was in progress and the boy was watching the ball in use in the game. The
defendant urged the court to recognize that assumption of the risk is ap-
plicable to contractual relationships, not just the traditional master-servant
relationship, but the court distinguished each of the defendant's cited cases
and relied on the judicial precedents recognizing the limited applicability
of the doctrine. The court noted with approval the Ohio decision of Cin-
cinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno,4 2 wherein it was stated that a spectator
at a ballpark does not assume the risk of being hit by a baseball he does
not see when more than one ball is being used regardless of whether the
game was in progress or not. Apparently, the court in Maytnier was saying
in effect that Illinois does not recognize assumption of the risk in cases of
this nature, but if it did, this spectator would not be subject to the defense
under the circumstances, as the ball was not being used in the game.
A case relied upon by defendant in Maytnier which represents the
broadest opinion on the subject of assumption of risk in the area of amuse-
ment park injuries is Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co.43 In that case, it
is argued as dicta that the doctrine was applicable in any relation volun-
tarily assumed. In Campion, a golfer was held to have assumed the risk of
being struck by a golf ball by another player, the suit having been brought
against the golf course. But what of the golfer who actually injured the
37 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48 § 172.38 (1965).
38 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 60.69 (1965).
39 Contributory negligence also is not a defense to an employee covered by the Scaf-
folding Act. See Brackett v. Osborne, 44 Ill. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 8 (2d Dist. 1963);
Thomas v. Carroll Const. Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 205, 144 N.E.2d 461 (2d Dist. 1957); Panky
v. Hiram Walker e Sons, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Ill., 1958); Fetterman v. Production
Steel Co. of Illinois, 4 111. App. 2d 403, 124 N.E.2d 637 (1st Dist. 1954).
40 I.L.P. 13.00 (1961) (Comment states that no Illinois cases extend the doctrine of
assumption of risk to an invitee other than in master-servant cases and amusement-equip-
ment cases).
41 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (Ist Dist. 1967).
42 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925).
43 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1st Dist. 1938) (extensive discussion of doctrine
of assumption of risk).
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plaintiff? Could he claim the defense? Such golfer is obviously not in a
master-servant relationship, nor is he in a contractual relationship with the
injured golfer. Under Illinois law the doctrine would not be available as
an affirmative defense, neither of the aforementioned relationships being
present. The question then becomes whether such a defense should be
available, or whether the doctrine is unnecessary outside the traditional
boundaries Illinois has followed.
It can reasonably be said that the plaintiff golfer must assume the
reasonable and ordinary risks attendant to the game of golf, such as when
the plaintiff is out of sight and hearing when another golfer hits his ball,
injuring the plaintiff. Can it also be reasonably said, under the guise of
assumption of the risk in its primary meaning, that the plaintiff assumes
the risk of injury from a fellow golfer's negligent participation in the game
as to suits between such golfers? Such negligent golfer should not be able to
rely on assumption of the risk to escape liability for his own negligence.
The rights of the parties can be explained in terms of the negligent golfer's
duty not to injure the plaintiff if such injury can be avoided by reasonable
care. The result is that absent the defendant's negligence or unreasonable
conduct toward the plaintiff there should be no recovery, the injury being
of the type the plaintiff might expect under the circumstances, but without
necessitating the use of assumption of the risk as a defense.
Beside the amusement park situation, the doctrine has been attempted
in other areas. In Reed v. Zellers,44 assumption of the risk was raised by a
defendant-host in an auto-guest case involving the plaintiff-minor who was
injured in an auto collision in dense fog and on a wet highway. The court
denied the applicability of the doctrine. The plaintiff had voluntarily taken
the trip. The court said there was no contractual relation which was essen-
tial to raise the defense.
The defendant-carriers in Coloyza v. Iowa Central Ry. Co.4 5 were per-
mitted to rely on both contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
as defenses in an action for personal injury against lessee and lessor railroad
corporations, despite the fact that the plaintiff was only the employee of one
of the defendants. In Sass v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 46 the defendant was
refused an instruction that a streetcar passenger assumes the risk of injury
from sudden motions or jerks, the court finding that assumption of the risk
did not apply to the relationship of carrier and passenger. In Hickey v.
Chicago City Ry. Co., 4 7 the plaintiff was injured in a streetcar collision as a
result of having taken a position of danger on the outside of the crowded
streetcar. On a public policy basis, the court denied assumption of the risk
as a defense, stating the doctrine is founded upon contract and a common
44 273 Il1. App. 18 (3d Dist. 1933).
45 182 11. App. 89 (1st Dist. 1913).
46 182 I1. App. 364 (Ist Dist. 1913).
47 148 111. App. 197 (lst Dist. 1909).
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carrier cannot relieve itself of liabitity for negligence by express or implied
contract.
Consent by the decedent to the unlawful act of abortion in Castronovo
v. Murawsky4s was held a bar to the plaintiff's recovery in a death action.
The defense raised in that case appears to be a cross between the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands and assumption of the risk. In Presley v. Kin-
lock-Bloomington Telephone Co.,49 the plaintiff's intestate was electrocuted
as a result of the defendants' alleged negligence. The court held the doctrine
of assumption of the risk was inapplicable because the intestate was not in
either the defendants' service or an employee.
In an innkeeper case, Duncan v. Chelsea Hotel Co.,5o the court held
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from a "Murphy bed" where
evidence showed the plaintiff knew the bed came down from the wall too
quickly. The court also discussed failure to exercise due care and stated that
the plaintiff's negligence contributed to her injury. Thus the court con-
cluded both that the plaintiff assumed the risk and was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.
Assumption of the risk has found limited use in the landlord-tenant
cases, usually under the doctrine's primary meaning, as in Mack v. Woman's
Club of Aurora.51 In that case, the plaintiff slipped and injured herself on a
waxed floor while attending her regular club meeting. The court held that
the defendant was not negligent and the plaintiff assumed the risk. In
Soibel v. Oconto Co.,52 the plaintiff-employee of the tenant sued the de-
fendant-landlord for injury arising from the floor of defendant's building
falling into the basement. The court found that, absent concealment or
fraud by landlord, the tenant's employee assumed the risk of personal in-
jury from defects, defendant's liability being no greater than that to the
tenant. However, in another landlord-tenant case, Minters v. Mid-City
Management Corp.,53 assumption of the risk was held applicable only in
the relationship of master-servant, and also in Mueller v. Phelps,54 since
there was no contractual relation between the tenant's servant and the
landlord, the court precluded the defense of assumption of the risk.
An Illinois products liability case, Cedar Rapids & Light Co. v. Sprague
48 3 Ill. App. 2d 168, 120 N.E.2d 871 (2d Dist. 1954).
49 158 Ill. App. 220 (3d Dist. 1910).
50 Duncan v. Chelsea Hotel Co., 326 Ill. App. 241, 61 N.E.2d 769 (lst Dist. 1945).
51 303 Ill. App. 217, 24 N.E.2d 898 (2d Dist. 1940). See also: Myrick v. Herrmann, 17
Ill. App. 2d 301, 149 N.E.2d 792 (4th Dist. 1958) (recognizes defense but says landlord
cannot rely on it where injury is in area of common control); Farmer v. Alton Building
& Loan Ass'n., 294 Ill. App. 206, 13 N.E.2d 652 (4th Dist. 1938); Helbig v. Slaughter, 95
Ill. App. 623 (3d Dist. 1900).
52 299 111. App. 518, 20 N.E.2d 309 (1st Dist. 1939).
53 Minters v. Mid-City Management Corp., 331 Ill. App. 64, 72 N.E.2d 729 (Ist Dist.
1947). See also: Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N.E. 354 (1905).
54 252 Ill. 630, 97 N.E. 228 (1912).
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Electric Co.,55 hinted at the applicability of assumption of the risk but the
court would not bring itself to express the defense by name. The court dis-
tinguished contributory negligence as a failure to discover the defect, but
then stated that contributory negligence was unreasonable exposure to a
known risk, it being necessary that the plaintiff discover the defect not that
it merely be discoverable upon inspection-all of which point to require-
ments peculiar to assumption of the risk.
Assumption of the risk was even attempted in the divorce action of
Hall v. Hall,56 but the court held that the doctrine did not preclude the
wife from a second divorce from the same husband after she had remarried
him and again suffered acts of extreme and repeated cruelty.
AREAS IN WHICH ASSuMPTION OF THE RISK MAY FIND VALID USE
In an action for strict liability, it is generally held that contributory
negligence is not a defense but assumption of the risk is. 57 In the leading
American case, Muller v. McKesson,58 the court held that the full knowledge
of the vicious propensities of an animal and the voluntary and unnecessary
placement by the plaintiff of himself in the way of such animal precludes
recovery. Keeping the animal did not produce the injury, rather it was the
plaintiff's acts, in spite of full knowledge of the danger, which resulted in
injury. The defendant should not be relieved from liability for slight negli-
gence by the plaintiff as the defendant's duty is higher than that of ordinary
care, but when the plaintiff voluntarily brings harm on himself, he should
not be permitted to recover. For instance, the defendant's blasting would
impose strict liability but the plaintiff cannot recover when he sees the
flagman and deliberately proceeds in the face of the appreciated danger.59
However, the plaintiff may recover if he was merely inattentive in not seeing
the flagman. Such conduct amounts to contributory negligence; however,
this defense, as mentioned, cannot be raised to a strict liability tort.60
Willful misconduct, an intentional tort, transcends negligence, an un-
intentional tort. Such willful misconduct justifies an award of punitive
damages and precludes contributory negligence as a defense.61 But plain-
55 280 Ill. 386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917).
56 Hall v. Hall, 148 Ill. App. 630 (2d Dist. 1909).
57 Prosser, Torts § 78 (3d ed. 1965); Graety v. McKenzie, 9 Wash. 696, 35 Pac. 377
(1893); Locthscher v. Campo, 107 Conn. 568, 141 Ad. 652 (1928).
58 73 N.Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tiff's own willful or wanton misconduct will deny recovery despite de-
fendant's wanton misconduct.62
A new area wherein the defense of assumption of the risk may see
limited use is comparative negligence. The Illinois Appellate Court de-
cision of Maki v. Frelk6 has attempted to implement comparative negli-
gence rules through judicial decision. The case details the history of
contributory negligence and the need for the new doctrine, but it fails to
mention assumption of the risk. However, much of the court's discussion
centers upon what actually is assumption of the risk in its secondary mean-
ing wherein the doctrine overlaps contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence approaches a type of comparative negligence
but fails to recognize degrees or net detriment to one or the other litigant,
unlike the comparative negligence doctrine imposed by Maki and based in
part upon rules familiar in admiralty.
Should comparative negligence become a reality in Illinois, through
case decision or statute, it would seem likely that contributory negligence
would not be a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery but assumption of the
risk may well be. This view has been taken by Wisconsin courts64 under its
comparative negligence statute.65 However, Illinois may continue to satisfy
its aversion to assumption of the risk in comparative negligence cases by
merely finding the plaintiff negligent in excess of any negligence of the
defendant, rather than admit to the doctrine and deny the plaintiff re-
covery under the defense of assumption of the risk.
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other jurisdictions have discussed assumption of the risk in a critical
manner. In 1965, Michigan virtually abolished assumption of the risk as an
affirmative defense in the case of FeIgner v. Anderson,66 in which the court
stated that certain risks of accident attend all outdoor sports and recovery
may be had only if an injury is the result of negligence that could and
should have been avoided by the use of ordinary care. The court further
states that the spectator's suit is barred by lack of -negligence on the part of
the park owner, not by the spectator's assumption of the risk. Although this
does not answer the question where the spectator knew of the owner's
negligence and voluntarily faced the danger, this is precisely the area where
the doctrine overlaps that of contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk being considered in its secondary meaning. The court refers to a law
62 Lane v. Babis, 340 Il. App. 10, 91 N.E.2d 106 (1950); Schneiderman v. Interstate,
331 Il1. App. 143, 72 N.E.2d 705 (1947); Learned v. Hawthorne, 269 Mass. 554, 169 N.E.
557 (1930); Johnson v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N.W.2d 394 (1952).
6a Maki v. Frelk, 85 111. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (2d Dist. 1967).
64 Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956); Scory v. LaFave,
251 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643 (1934).
65 Wis. Stat. 331.045 (1959).
66 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965).
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review article67 where it is suggested that, except for express assumption
of the risk, the term and concept should be abolished. The court said that
it would limit the doctrine to the employer-employee relationship where
workman's compensation does not apply and perhaps where there is an
express contractual assumption of the risk. The court further stated that
the only purpose served by the doctrine is to limit the scope of the de-
fendant's liability for injuries caused to the plaintiff.
Similarly, in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,6s the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that assumption of the risk should be used only
in its "primary sense" to mean the defendant either owed no duty or did
not breach the duty owed. The court also said that should the term be used,
the jury should be instructed that it is merely another way of expressing the
thought that the defendant is not liable in the absence of negligence, and
if the defendant is found negligent, the plaintiff is barred only if the de-
fendant proves contributory negligence. This view was later extended in
McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.,69 the New Jersey court holding that
it should concentrate on the terms negligence and contributory negligence
and not use assumption of the risk at all, either in its primary or secondary
sense.
CONCLUSION
Despite a few decisions to the contrary, Illinois restricts the doctrine
of assumption of the risk at least to contractual relationships if not strictly
to the traditional master-servant relationship. This restriction does not
usually work hardship upon a defendant as his proof of lack of duty or
adequate performance of a duty or the plaintiff's failure to reasonably care
for his own safety and welfare is sufficient to relieve him of liability. How-
ever, contributory negligence as a defense is an admission of negligence by
the defendant, unlike assumption of the risk which should be a valid defense
in certain limited areas, especially where the defendant is not negligent at
all, but is being sued under circumstances such as strict liability for carry-
ing on an ultrahazardous activity.
It would be to the court's advantage to avoid the confusion over a
period well in excess of one hundred years of misuse by restricting the doc-
trine, not to master-servant or contract relationships, but to strict liability,
intentional torts and cases involving comparative negligence. Previous use
of the doctrine in its primary and secondary meaning should be relegated to
the defenses of lack of duty on the part of the defendant or failure to breach
such duty, coupled with contributory negligence or comparative negligence
where applicable.
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